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Liability for Mobile Health and Wearable
Technologies*
Nicolas P. Terry** & Lindsay F. Wiley***
I. INTRODUCTION

Notoriously, health care is relatively immune to traditional market forces'
and is more difficult to disrupt than other industries.2 Instead, change has
been reliant on massively compromised and politically fraught interventions,
such as the Affordable Care Act.' Mobile health offers a different, parallel
path. It promises better and more personalized care combined with improved
convenience and lower cost 4

Many, if not most, mobile health applications ('apps_) and wearable
devicesthattrack fitness, wellness, or other physiological data do notsupport
existing models of health care.s Rather, developers are delivering a novel
consumer-centric aesthetic and functionality that traditional healthcare
policynakers are only now beginning to conceptualize.6 Notwithstanding,
the division between traditional health care and mobile health is anything but
* 0 2016 Nicolas Terry & Lindsay Wiley. All right reserved. This paper is based
on
presentations we prepared for a workshop sponsored by the A meri can A ssoci ati on for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS). We thank all the workshop participant and, in particular,
Deborah Runkle, Senior Program Associate at AAAS for her valuable comment. We also
thank Mark Levy and Maya Frazier, American University Washington College of Law J D
candidates, for their helpful research assistance and Kelci Dye, Indiana University Robert H.
McKinney School of Lawj D candidate, for her diligent editing.
** Hall Render Professor of Law & Executive Director, Hall Center for Law and Health,
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** Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. Email:
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1. Alain C. Enthoven, Market Forces and Efficient Health Care Systems, 23 HEALTH AFF.
25, 25 (2004).
2. See Nicolas P. Terry, Inforrmtion Technology-s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13
NEV. L.J. 722, 723 (2013) (noting the difficulties faced by one possible health care disruptor,
health information technology (HIT)).
3. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119(2010) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. f 18001 (Supp. 2010)).
4. Nicolas Terry, Innovation in Mobile Health In-pacts Law, IND. LAW. (July 15, 2015),
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/innovation-in-rmobiIe-health-inpactlaw/PARAMS/article/37699.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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clean.' Some mobile health apps are 'provider-facing,_ targeting the
traditional physician-patient relationship designed to improve data access or
efficiency.' Other apps, while designed for consumers, may be developed by
traditional healthcare providers or thei r busi ness partners.' Many patients will
acquire apps or wearables with the intention of presenting the data to their
providers, looking for professional approval, further recommendations, or
even technical assistance. 10 Some providers may attempt to manage the app
onslaught by recommending only certain apps or even curating their own app
formularies.11
Much of the mobile health revolution likely will play out in lightly
regulated spaces bereft of most of the privacy, security, and safety rules
associated with traditional health care.12 The non-provider actors at most risk
of legal liability are the developers and app vendors who may have only a
cursory knowledge of the exceptional legal rules and protections to which
patients and providers are accustomed.
Most of the legal commentary regarding mobile health has focused on
direct regulation.13 Congress and several federal agencies have begun to

7.

See id. (noting that there is a 'health care revolution- going on and that mobile health

is 'poised to upset the model _.
8. See generally Pragati V erma, How Electronic Health Records Will Be More Helpful to
Doctors - And Patient, FORBES (April 27, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.comsites/cit/
201 5/04/27/how-electroni c-health-records-wi Il-be-more-helpful-to-doctors-andpatients/#45480d777a15 (predicting flexible, mobile cloud-based acute care electronic health
records will enable better integration, allowing physicians to view a patients information,
respond to patient messages using quick text and assess a patient-s refill requests).
9.

See Bob Spoerl, 6 Trends in an Era of Consumer-Driven Healthcare, BECKER-s Hosp.

REV.

( une 6, 2012), http://www.beckershospitalreview.comstrategic-planning/6-trends-in-

an-era-of-consumer-driven-healthcare.html (stating, 'The fact that hospitals are seeking to
make more intimate connections with patients and treating them as consumers is not a new
phenomenon. But now, in an era when mobile access and social media brings a sense of hyperconnectivity to life, the trend may seem more pronounced than ever before.).
10. SeeJoseph Conn, Easy on Those Apps: Mobile Medical Apps Gain Support but Many
Lack Clinical Evidence, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Nov. 28, 2015), http://www.rmodern
healthcare.comarticle/201511 28/MA GAZIN E/311289981 (explaining that approximately
sixteen percent of health care professionals currently use mobile applications with their
patient, but that forty-six percent plan to do so in the next five years).
11. See id. (recommending home blood-pressure apps because patients blood pressure
often rises when they enter the office).
12. Mobile Medical Applications, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/MobileMedicalApplications/default.html#e (last updated Sept.
22, 2015).
13. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.1173,
1179 (2014) (focusing on the mobile health-s potential of mobile health by examining

regulators such as the FDA); see also Nicolas P. Terry, Mobile Health: Assessing the Barriers,
147 CHEST 1429, 1430-33 (2015) (focusing on the potential of mobile health apps in the

context of safety and privacy, discussing regulations in mobile health apps).
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address the risks posed by these technologies. 14 Some commentators have
urged the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to provide more meaningful oversight to ensure that
mobile health technologies are safe and effective," while others have
cautioned that regulatory overreach may stifle innovation. 16 This article
focuses on another means for ensuring that mobile health technologies are
developed and used in a safe, effective, and data-protective manner indirect
regulation through liability models applied to healthcare professionals,
healthcare institutions, and app developers.
The areas of malpractice, product liability, and privacy liability remain
primarily case law driven, but at this stage in the development of mobile
health, there is little case law directly on point. We extrapolate from cases
addressing analogous issues to assess potential liability concerns for health
care providers who: (1) participate in the design of mobile health products;17
(2) use' or decline to use' mobile health products for patient care; and (3)
recommend or even prescribe the use of mobile health products by patients.18
We further suggest that the advent of mobile health technologies does not
necessitate the development of novel legal doctrines. Rather, existing
doctrines are adequate to apply tort and privacy law to the development, use,
recommendation, and prescription of mobile health products by healthcare
professionals.19
Like any other new medical technology, mobile health products are likely
to amplify existing uncertainties in the tort liability context, at least in the
short term 20 In particular, the standard of care for professional malpractice'
which is based on the customary or prevailing practices of the professional

14 See Cortez, supra note 13, at 1201 '[C]ongress and the FDA have prioritized which
devices deserve more regulatory attention based on the risks they present. _); see also 21 C. F. R.
f 860.7 (2008) (ruling that the FDA will review evidence concerning the safety and
effectiveness of a medical device).
15. Cortez, supra note 13, at 1230; Stephen McInerney, Can You Diagnose Me Now? A
Proposal to Modify F DA-s Regulation of Srmrtphone Mobile Health Applications with a PreMarket Notification and Application Database Systemr 70 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 161, 179(2015).
16. Brady Donnelly, While Healthcare Apps Are on the Rise, the F DA Threatens to Stifle
Innovation in the U.S., TNW NEWS (June 9, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://thenextweb.comfinsider/
201 2/06/09/whi le-healthcare-apps-are-on-the-rise-the-fda-threatens-to-stifle-i nnovation-i nthe-u-s/#gref.
17. See Beth S. Rose, Uncharted Territory: Mobile Medical Apps and Product
Liability Collide, NJ. L.J. (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.njlawjournal.comfid=1202744463977/
U ncharted-Territory- Mobil e-M edi cal-A pps-and-Product-L iability-Collide
(noting
that
liability regarding mobile health will likely 'turn on the performance or design of the app
itself_).
18. Pam Baker, Mobile Health Apps, Part 4: Life, Death and Lawsuits, TECH NEWS
WORLD (May 5, 2011, 5:00AM), http:/ANww.technewsworld.com/story/72394.html.
19. Rose, supra note 17.
20. Baker, supra note 18.
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community' could act as a temporary drag on the adoption of new mobile
health technologies by professionals, who may prefer to proceed with caution
until prevai Ii ng professional practi ces emerge with respect to mobile health
use. 2 1 Over time, however, if these technologies prove useful and reliable,
they could be incorporated into the standard of care in some contexts.22 At
that point, the customary-practice standard of care might accelerate adoption
of mobile health technologies by recalcitrant physicians who would
otherwise face potential liability for failing to make use of applications that
have been incorporated into the prevailing practices of the profession.23
Similar conclusions apply to our treatment of product liability-based
exposure of app developers and vendors. Notwithstanding the dearth of
decided cases, direct institutional healthcare liability or product liability
theories could be applied to those involved in mobile development and
deployment. This is the case whether the actors are inside or outside the
traditional healthcare system
Part II of this paper provi des an introduction to the terminology used, and
presents a brief typol ogy of the apps appearing in the health care space. Part
III discusses the potential liability of physicians and other healthcare
professionals. Part IV discusses the potential liability of institutional
healthcare providers such as hospitals (that, in many cases are dependent
upon the finding of fault in an individual professional). Part V discusses the
applicability of product liability to mobile health developers and vendors.
PartVI explains some of the issues that may arise when patients or consumers
seek damages following privacy or security breaches. The survey concludes
by noting that regulation by litigation will be a significant force in the app
and wearable arena during a period of light regulation by traditional
21.

See Deven McGraw et al., Going Digital with Patients: Managing Potential Liability
PARTICIPATORY MED. (Dec.
18, 2013), available at http://www.jopm.org/perspective/narratives/2013/12/18/going-digitalwith-pati ents-managi ng-potenti al-I i ability-ri sks-of-patient-generated-electroni c-healthinformation/(noting the reluctance of some physicians to receive patient data through digital
forms because of professional liability concerns and the lack of a clear standard of care).
22. The disadvantage of the customary-practice standard of care, its indeterminacy, is
linked to its advantage, flexibility. The customary-practice standard is flexible enough to
accommodate changes in technology and professionals- use of it. New technology' whether
it be MRI, pulse oximetry, or an app' challenges health care professionals to adapt their
practice. When adoption of such a technology becomes prevai Ii ng practice among the relevant
profession, it is more or less automatically incorporated into the customary-practice standard
of care.
23. Overall the literature is murky when it comes to physicians and the adoption of health
information technologies. For example, there is some evidence that physicians who adopt
EHRs have a lower malpractice rate, Mariah A. Quinn et al., The Relationship Between
Electronic Health Records and Malpractice Claims, 172 ARCH INTERN MED. 1187, 1187-89
(2012). However, any impact does not seemto be factored into medical malpracticepremiums,
Hye Y eong Kim & J inhyung Lee, Effects of Health Inforation Technology on Malpractice

Risks of Patient-Generated Electronic Health Inforation, 5J.

Insurance Premiums, 21

HEALTHCARE INFORMATICs RES.
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regulators. This is a conclusion that is unlikely to encourage either healthcare
providers or app developers, given that the indeterninacy associated with
common law litigation is only exacerbated when applied to novel or
emerging technologies.
II. TYPOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY

The development of computing hardware, software platforms (operating
systems), and the software and services sitting atop them has been
extraordinary, with 'Moores law provid[ing] an unprecedented combination
of blistering progress and certainty about the near future. 24 It took a while
for mainframes to be replaced by personal computers (PC), while the
movement to the post-PC world of mobiles has been comparatively rapid.2 5
However, increased miniaturization and rapid iteration are now delivering
the post-mobile future of wearabl es.26 In this article the term mobile health is
used to describe several overlapping technologies: health apps running on
mobile devices, sensors and software built into mobile device platforms, and
wearable technologies. However, the article does not consider the use of
general mobile technologies, such as email or texti ng that may be used in the
healthcare setting.
Tens of thousands of mobile health products are already available on the
market.27 A typology developed by Nathan Cortez, which organizes these
products according to function, is a useful starting point for our analysis. 28
'Connectors_ connect 'smartphones and tablets to FDA-regulated devices,_
24.

Double, Double, Toil and Trouble,

ECONOMIST: TECH.

Q. 3 (March 12, 2016),

available at http://www.economist.comtechnology-quarterly/2016-03-12/after-rmoores-law.
25. See generally Gina Smith, Post PC Era Buzzword: Net Pioneer and MIT Futurist
David Clark Used it First in 1999, A NEw DOMAIN, http://anewdomain.net/2012/10/13/postpc-era-buzzword-mit-david-clark-used-it-first-i n-1 999/ (last visited March. 12, 2016)
(describing the characteristics of thepost-PC world); seegenerallyTHE NIELSEN Co.,THE U.S.
DIGITAL CONSUMER REPORT

(Feb. 10, 2014), available at http://www.nielsen.comfus/en/

insights/reports/2014/the-us-digital-consumeor-report. html.
26. See generallyJ eanne Meister, The Wearable Era Is Here: Implications for the Future
Workplace, FORBES ( une 16, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeannem-eister/
2014/06/1 6/the-wearable-era-is-here-i mpl i cati ons-for-the-future-workplace/#5ffe995fl 7bd
(noting that the Wearable Era is 'a time when smart accessories will in turn push aside regular
old phones and Tablets.j. For a general definition of what a wearable is and is not, see Dan
Sung, What is Wearable Tech? Everything You Need to Know Explained, WAREABLE (Aug. 3,
2015), http://www.wareable.comwearable-tech/what-is-wearable-tech-753 ('The new age of
wearables tap into the connected self - they-re laden with smart sensors, and make sue use of
a web connection, usually using Bluetooth to connect wirelessly to your smartphone. _.
27. Matt Goodman, Study Argues Booming Mobile Health Industry Would Benefit from

Increased FDA Regulation,

DALLAS/FORT WORTH HEALTHCARE

DAILY

(Aug. 5, 2014),

http://healthcare.drmgazine.com2014/08/05/study-argues-booming-mobile-health-industrywould-benefit-from-increased-fda-regulation/ (noting there were more than 97,000 mobile
health apps on the market as of March 2013).
28. Cortez, supra note 13, at 1179.
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enabling clinicians to view scans and other biometric readings, and/or act as
wireless remote controls for medical devices, raising the possibility of patient
injuries.2 9 'Replicators_ turn 'the smartphone or tablet itself into a medical
devi ce_ usi ng 'attachments or sensors to send data di rectly to the smartphone,
which then processes and displays the results,_ and in some cases
recommends, diagnoses or provides treatment options.3 0 'Automators_ and
'custonizers_ use surveys, algorithms, and the like to aid clinical decisionmaking but could lead to faulty diagnosis or treatment decisions.3 1
'Informers_ and 'educators,_ which make up a significant portion of the
hundreds of mobile health apps now on the market are digital versions of
resources that are also available in print or would have been in the past 3 2
'Administrators_ are the mobile health equivalent of practice management
software' to the extent that they are confined to scheduling patient
appointments and performing billing functions; there would not appear to be
any significant liability concerns regarding administrator apps.33 Y et, as they
start to incorporate automator and customizer functions to triage patients for
appointments,' they could expose healthcare providers to liability.
'Loggers and 'trackers_ allow users to record and analyze information
about their diet, physical activity, sleep patterns, and so on.36
The FDA has its own, somewhat less transparent mobile health app
typology, suggesting ten types of apps in recently-published guidance for the
medical application industry and FDA. That guidance identified mobile
apps that could be regulated under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act either 'as an accessory to a regulated medical device; orto
transforma mobile platform into a regulated medical device. _ 3 T he guidance
then identified classes of apps over which the FDA would exercise regulatory
29. Id. at 1182.
30. Id. at 1184.
31. Id. at 1186.
32. Id. at 1188.
33. Id. at 1189.
34. Id.
35. Ken Terry, A Physician-s Guide to Prescribing Mobile Health Apps, MED. ECON.
(Oct. 8, 2014), http://m-edicalecononics.modernmedicine.commedical-economics/content/
tags/201 4-ehr-scorecard/physici ans-guide-prescri bi ng-mobi le-health-apps?page=ful I
(discussing the fear physicians have when dealing with medical mobile apps causing them to
be very general when recomm-endi ng apps to patients).
36. Cortez, supra note 13, at 1189.
37. See generally U.S. DEP-T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MOBILE MEDICAL
APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF

13-18 (2015) [hereinafter FDA 2015 GUIDANCE], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Medical
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM263366.pdf (superseding
the original Guidance issued in September 2013, but the 2015 Guidance is pri rmarily consistent
with the original Guidance).
38. Id. at 12.

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol25/iss2/4
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discretion (such as fitness trackers).39 T he F DA approach remains useful for
our current task because the agency-s risk-based approach to regulation or
the exercise of its regulatory discretion should be loosely predictive of harm
and liability exposure.4 0
Mobile apps and wearables can be roughly divided into two categories:
those that are essentially healthcare provider-facing, a greater part of the
'digital health_ domain, and those that are patient or consumer-facing.4 1 T he
former includes:
(1) apps providing remote control of medical device or enabling remote
display or analysis of data from medical device (connectors); 42 (2) apps,
wearables, sensors, or attachments providing functions similar to those of
currently regulated medical devices (replicators);43 and (3) apps, wearables,
or sensors performing patient-specific analysis, diagnosis, or treatment
recomrnendati ons (automators and customizers).4
In contrast, consumer apps include: (1) apps providing access to health
records, 45 (2) consumer versions of existing medical devices,4 6 (3) condition
monitoring and management apps,47 (4) fitness trackers and wellness
coaches,4 and (5) diagnosis or treatment apps. 49
Obviously, there will be overlaps between the categories. Both patients
39. Id. at 23-26.
40. See id. at 13 (noting the FDA -s intent to 'apply its regulatory oversight to only those
mobile apps that are medical devices and whose functionality could pose a risk to a patients
safety if the mobile app were to not function as intended._).
41.
See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/MobileMedicalApplications/default.htm
(discussing the FDA regulations for mobile medical apps and how these apps assist providers
and consumers, and also discussing that consumers can use both mobile medical apps and
mobile apps so manage their own health and wellness) [hereinafter FDA MEDICAL APPs].
42. Cortez, supra note 13, at 1182.
43. Id.at1184.
44. Id. at 1186.
45. See generally Medfusion Launches First Consumer Mobile App to Simplify
Healthcare Records, MEDFUSION (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.medfusion.compressrel eases/medfusi on-launches-first-consumer-mobile-app-to-si rmpl ify-healthcare-records/.
46. See generally FDA MEDICAL APPS, supra note4l (stating that, 'Mobile medical apps
are medical devices that are medical apps, meet the definition of a medical device, and are in
accessory to a regulated medical device or transform a mobile platform into a regulated
medical device._).
47. SeegenerallyJulie Bird, 7 Mobile Apps for Chronic Condition Management, FIERCE
MOBILE HEALTHCARE, (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.fiercemobilehealthcare.com/slideshows/
7-rmobile-apps-chronic-condition-management (discussing the top consumer mobile apps for
chronic condition management).
48. See generally FDA, MEDICAL APPs, supra note41 (stating that, 'Consumers can use
both mobile medical apps and mobile apps to manage their own health and wellness, such as
to monitor their caloric intake for healthy weight maintenance).
49. See id. (discussing how some apps are used for diagnostic purposes for diagnosing
and treating different patient conditions).
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and providers may be customers for app-based versions of existing medical
devices. For example, both patients and providers might make use of a blood
pressure cuff that plugs into an iPhone.s0 Equally, some consumer-facing
wearables, such as Google Glass, have migrated over into provider-facing
space." To put it another way, an app that allows a physician to access a
hospital s clinical decision system reflects the steady march of
miniaturization, while putting a diagnostic app in the hands of a consumer is
potentially disruptive.
Although mobile health apps can be roughly categorized by function, at
present wearables are relatively undifferentiated. The overwhelming
majority are attachments, and occasionally fashion statements, and most of
those use the wrist as their attachment point H owever, in the near future that
picture is likely to change as 'wearables_ are applied as temporary tattoos,5 2
or technology is incorporated i nto contact lenses. 3 Future generation devices
likely will be inserted subcutaneously, or otherwise implanted or ingested,
challenging the current nomenclature. Inthefuture, some of our 'wearables_
may even be neural.' Such fragmentation may well lead to more
differentiation in their regulation. For now, however, wearables as they are
currently understood, can be grouped with mobile health apps and the mobile
platforms that frequently control or monitor them.
Each type of app poses different safety and privacy risks," and exposure
to liability varies depending on the role of the potential defendant In general
terms, healthcare providers may face negligence-based claims when they
supply or curate apps that cause harm. 6 In contrast, developers of defective

50. One such example is already available. See, e.g. Withings Wireless Blood Pressure
Monitor, WlTHINGS, https://www.withings.com'us/en/products/blood-pressure-monitor (last
visited March 23, 2016).
51. Nicolas Terry et al., Google Glass and Health Care: Initial Legal and Ethical

Questions, 8J.

HEALTH & LIFE

Scl. L. 93, 95 (2015).

52. Lydia Ramsey, Stick-On Tattoo Measures Blood Sugar Without Needles, POPULAR
Scl. UJan. 20, 2015), http://www.popsci.comtemporary-tattoos-could-rmonitor-diabetes-lessinvasively (researchers at the University of California San Diego have designed a needle-free
blood sugar reading device that uses electrodes on temporary tattoo paper).
53. Quinten Plummer, Google Sart Contact Lens to H itThe Market Soon?, TECH TIMES
U une 28, 2016, 3:38 A M), http://www.techti mes.com/articles/63868/201 50628/googl e-smartcontact-lens-to-hit-the-market-soon.htm.
54. Emotiv is an example of a company producing neural devices. EMOTIV,
https://ermotiv.com (last visited April 13, 2015, 2:50 PM). For a discussion of the potential
benefits, as well as initial critiques of such devices, see Mark Honigsbaum, Could this $300
Headset Transform the Lives of :Locked-In- Patients?, THE GUARDIAN 0uly 11,
2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.comtechnology/2014/jul/11/kickstarter-headsetlocked-in-syndrome-communication.
55. See generally Terry, supra note 13, at 1430-33 (discussing the various risks).
56. Nathaniel R. Carroll, Mobile Medical App Regulation: Preventing a Pandenic of
'Mobilechondriacs_, 7 ST. LouIs Uj HEALTH L. & POL-Y 415, 429(2014).
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apps may face strict liability claims for breach of warranty or common law
product liability.17
III. HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

To hold a physician or other healthcare professional liable for malpractice,
a plaintiff must establish four elements." First, duty' the plaintiff must
establish that a treatment relationship was in effect at the time of breach, and
such that the defendant health care professional owed a duty of care to
plaintiff patient. 9 Second, breach' the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant professional -s conduct fell below the standard of care.' Third,
damages' the plaintiff must establish that she or he suffered physical harm 61
Fourth, causation' the plaintiff must establish a sufficient nexus between the
defendant-s breach and the plaintiffs harm. 62 As discussed in detail below,
for physicians or other health care professionals who participate in the design
or development of mobile health products, the primary issue is likely to be
duty. 63 For those who use mobile health products in the context of patient
care or who recommend or prescribe the use of such products by patients, the
primary issue is likely to be breach.'
A. Professionals Contributing to Design of Apps
Some, but far from all, mobile health products are developed with input
from healthcare professionals. 65 In addition to the strict liability exposure
faced by all app developers and marketers, healthcare professionals who
participate in product development may also face professional malpractice
liability. Ultimately, healthcare professionals who participate in the design of

57. Kevin M. Henley, Tracking the Likelihood of Liability from Health Apps, LAw360
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/629313/tracking-the-likelihood-of-liabilityfrom-health-apps.
58. E.g., B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States, 467
CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS & RELATED RES. 339, 342 (2009), available at http://doi.org/
10.1007/si 1999-008-0636-2.
59. E.g., id.
60. E.g., id.
61. E.g., id.
62. See e.g. id.; see also Provost v. FletcherAllen Health Care, 2005 VT 115, 616, 890
A.2d 97, 100; Giles v. Anonymous Physician I, 13 N.E.3d 504, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
63. See infra Part III. A (discussing physicians who could be found liable for contributing
to the design of a medical app).
64. Carroll, supra note 56, at 429.
65. See e.g., Maged N. Kamel Boulos et al., Mobile Medical and Health Apps: State of
the Art, Concerns, Regulatory Control and Certification, 5 ONLINE J. PUB. HEALTH
INFORMATICS 1, 9 (2014), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261222082 Mobile_
medicalandhealth appsState ofthe_ artconcernsregulatorycontrol andcertification
(noting various apps had between 32-34% professional involvement).
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mobile health products for use by the general public are unlikely to be held
liable on the basis of professional malpractice for injuries caused to
individuals with whom they have not entered into a treatment relationship. A
physician who exercises medical judgment in designing or developing a
diagnostic automator or customizer, for example, might fall below the
standard of care and her negligence might cause injury to patients whom are
misdiagnosed or mistreated by providers relying on the app. However, in the
absence of a physician-patient relationship between the developer-physician
and the injured plaintiff-patient, the plaintiff will not be able to establish the
duty element of a malpractice claim. 66 Other kinds of tort liability, such as
products liability or ordinary negligence, could be a concern, but not
professional malpractice.67
Where there is no nexus at all between the patient-plaintiff and the
developer-physician, the duty element would not be satisfied." On the other
hand, if the developer is also the treating physician (i.e., a physician develops
an app and then uses it for the care of her own patients) then the duty element
would be met and the court would move on to breach and causation to
determine whether the case should be brought before a jury.' There is,
perhaps, a murky middle ground where a physician develops an app and then
shares it with other physicians in her practice or network, who then rely on it
for diagnosis and treatment or prescribe it for use by their patients. As
detailed below, in analogous situations, courts often find that a physicianpatient relationship is formed based on minimal interaction between the two
parties, but some form of engagement of the physician with a particular
patient is generally required. 70
1. Cases Suggestive of Liability
A physician-patient relationship can be formed with quite minimal contact
between the physician and patient, or even in the absence of any physical
contact between the two at all. 71 The question is typically whether medical
judgment has been exercised with regard to a particular patient-s case.72 For

66.
67.

See Bal, supra note 58, at 342.
See Rose, supra note 17.

68. See Gilesv. Anonymous Physician I, 13 N.E.3d 504, 510-11 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (discussing duty of care and the relationship between the physician and
patient).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Adarms v. Via Christi Regi Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 139-40 (Kan. 2001)
(discussing various cases where a relationship between the physician exists or does not exist);
see also Bienz v. Cent. Suffolk Hosp., 557 N.Y .S.2d 139, 139-40 (App. Div. 1990).
72. See, e.g., Bienz, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
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example, in Bienz v. Central Suffolk Hospital, an individual who called the
physician -s office 'for the purpose of initiating treatment_ sued the physician
for malpractice. T he physician moved for summary j udgment arguing that
a telephone call to initiate treatment does not form a physician-patient
relationship. 4 The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment, finding
that a relationship may have formed and that more fact-finding was necessary
to determine whether any medical advice had been given during the call1. 7
Similarly, in Adams v. Via Christi Regional Medical Center, a malpractice
claim was filed against an obstetrician following the death of a woman due
to an undetected ectopic pregnancy.76 Although the defendant physician had
treated the woman previously, he had not seen her as a patient for several
years.' On the evening she died, her mother called the physician and asked
questions about her daughters abdominal pain. The physician explained to
the pati ent-s mother that such pain is typical during pregnancy, recommended
she go to the emergency room if her condition worsened, and to go see
physician in the morning. Later that evening, she was taken to the hospital
and died.'o The physician moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing
that he had not re-formed a physician-patient relationship based on the
conversation with the girl s mother over the phone." The court affirmed the
judgment against the physician, finding that, because he did not decline to
provide his medical opinion on her case, he cannot say that he declined to
form a physician-patient relationship.82
Where physicians have provided telemedicine consults, courts have
sometimes allowed the jury to determine, based on the specific facts of the
case, that a physician-patient relationship was formed. In White v. Harris,
for example, the parents of a psychiatric patient who committed suicide sued
a psychiatrist who had one online video consultation with the girl as part of
a research study on tel emedi ci ne." T he court reversed the lower court-s grant
of summary j udgment, finding that the one-ti me consultati on was sufficient

73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 139-40.
76. Adams, 19 P.3d at 132.
77. Id. at 134.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 134-35.
81. Id. at 139-40.
82. Id. at 141-42.
83. See, e.g., B ovara v. St. Francis Hosp., 700 N.E.2d 143, 144 (111. App. Ct. 1998); see
also, White v. Harris, 2011 VT 115, 61, 36 A.3d 203, 204 (V t. 2011).
84. White, VT 115, at 61-2, 36 A.3d at 203.
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to form a physician-patient relationship, giving rise to a duty of care." The
court remanded for the lower court to permit discovery on the scope of the
duty and whether the physician-s conduct satisfied the standard of care. 6
Another example, Bovara v. St Francis Hospital, involved a malpractice
claim against two physicians who reviewed a patient-s film from an
angiogram and informed the treating physician that the plaintiff was a
candidate for angioplasty.87 T he court found that the physicians, despite their
lack of direct contact with the patient, could have formed a physician-patient
relationship with hi m.1 B ecause the question was one for the jury, the court
reversed the granting of summary j udgment in favor of the physicians.
2. Cases Suggesting No Liability
On the other hand, courts have sometimes declined to find that a treatment
relationship exists in cases where the consulting physician did not have
sufficient contact with the patient.' In] ennings v. Badgett for example, the
parents of a prematurely delivered child sued, among others, Dr. Schlinke,
who had consulted over the phone with the treating physician.91 The parents
contended that Schlinke was liable because his advice prompted the treating
physician to deliver the baby prematurely.92 The court found that no
physician-patient relationship was formed and that 'even though Dr. Badgett
chose to rely on Dr. Schlinke-s opinion, Dr. Badgett was free to exercise his
independent judgment.- Similarly, in Hill by Burston v. Kokosky, the
mother of a child born with cerebral palsy sued the physicians who had
consulted with her treating physician about alternative birthing options.' The
plaintiff alleged that the physicians provided substandard advice to the
treating physician.95 The court found that the consulting physicians could not
be held liable based on a telephone call with the treating physician because
neither of the consulting physicians had talked with the patient, exanined
her, or reviewed her chart.96
The courts are divided as to whether a remote consultation with the
85. Id. at 610, 36 A.3d at 207.
86. Id. at 614-15, 36 A.3d at 208-09.
87. Bovara, 700 N.E.2d at 144.
88. Id. at 148.
89. Id. at 149-50.
90. See generally Hill ex rel. Burston v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990); see alsoJ enningsv. Badgett 2010 OK 7, 620, 230 P.3d 861, 867.
91. Jennings, 2010 OK 7, at 69, 230 P.3d at 864-65.
92. Id. at 67, 230 P.3d at 864.
93. Id. at 6 25, 230 P.3d at 868.
94. K okosky, 463 N.W.2d at 265-266.
95. Id. at 266.
96. Id. at 267.
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treating physician is sufficient in the absence of interaction between the
consulting physician and the patient.' However, it appears that engagement
by the physician on a specific patient-s case as evidenced by contact or record
review, is a sine qua non.' As a result, it is unlikely that a physician, who
participates in the design or development of a mobile health product for use
by the general public, rather than one destined for her own patients, would be
subj ect to professional malpractice I iabi Iity." D evel opment of an app for use
by patients within a particular physician group practice or network might be
considered a gray area, based on the existence of the nexus between the
defendant-physician and the plaintiffs treating physician, but liability
remains unlikely in the absence of the defendant-physician s exercise of
medical judgment with respect to an identifiable patient as opposed to a
general patient population.100
3. Disciplinary Action for Provision of Medical Services in the Absence of
a Physician-Patient Relationship
Although malpractice liability for developer-physicians is unlikely in the
absence of a physician-patient relationship, it is worth noting that there are
several telemedicine cases in which medical boards have taken disciplinary
action against physicians who performed medical services' especially
prescription writing' without forming a physician-patient relationship.101

97. Id. (finding that 'whether a physician-patient relationship arises from a treating
physician-s solicitation of a colleague-s informal opinion on patient treatment is an issue of
first impression, - but other jurisdictions have considered this question in other ways).
98. Millerv. Martig, 754 N.E.2d 41,46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ('Generally, where a doctor
does not treat see, or in any way participate in the care or diagnosis of the plaintiff-patient
prior to or during surgery, a doctor-patient relationship will not be found to exist._); see also
Irvinv. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 942(Kan. 2001); see generally Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp.,
802 A.2d 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
99. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d at 268 (finding that the consulting physician did not have a
duty because he remotely provides advice based on limited information about a specific
patient).
100. Id. at 267 (holding that a 'limited and remote connection to the case cannot be
equated with:treatment-_).
101. See Jones v. N. D. State Bd. of Med. Exam-rs, 2005 ND 22, 66 21-22, 691
N.W.2d 251, 259 (finding thatJ ones acted unethically and provided inappropriate, harmful
prescriptions over the Internet without examining patients in person first); see also Golob v.
Ariz. Med. Bd., 176 P.3d 703, 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that the board could
discipline a physician that failed to establish a physician-patient relationship with his patients);
see also FED N OF STATE MED. BD.S, INTERNET PRESCRIBING-STATE MEDICAL BOARD
POLICIES/STATE LEGISLATION, http://www.fsmb.org/Media/Default/PDF/FSMB/Advocacy/
SMB_ Policies-State_ LawsINTE RNET.pdf(lastvisited Mar.18, 2016) (exhibitingamapand
listing policies and laws limiting the use of Internet-based prescriptions). For a representative
but controversial medical board rule, see 22 Tex. Admin. Code f 190.8(1)(L) (2015), which
prompted the filing of an antitrust suit by a large provider of telemedicine services; see also
Eric Wicklund, Federal J udge Sides with Teladoc in Texas Telemedicine Debate, MHEALTH
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These cases suggest that while the absence of a treatment relationship is
likely to protect physician-developers from tort liability when consumers are
injured, the absence of a treatment relationship may expose physiciandevelopers to disciplinary action.102
In] ones v. North Dakota State Board of Medical Exaniners-Investigative
Panel B, Dr. Jones worked for an online prescription service, providing
prescriptions for non-narcotic medications (mostly erectile dysfunction
drugs) to individualswhofilled outthe company-s online survey. Dr.] ones
reviewed the survey responses and occasionally operators made personal
calls for further information.1" The State Board revoked the physician-s
license for writing prescriptions without establishing a physician-patient
relationship and Dr. J ones appealed, arguing he did not violate the state
medical statute.105 The court agreed with the board-s findings, that writing
approximately seventy-two prescriptions per hour made it impossible for him
to spend sufficient time evaluating a patient-s medical needs to establish a
physician-patient relationship. 106
Similarly, in Golob v. Arizona Medical Board, the Arizona Medical Board
censured and put Dr. Golob on probation for providing prescriptions to
individuals through an online prescription service without forming a
physician-patient relationship.107 Individuals filled out an online form and
paid a fee for the questionnaire to be reviewed by the physician.108 In some
cases, the individuals would answer questions over the phone, but operators
working for the company, rather than the physician, would ask the
questions.1" Dr. Golob purportedly 'directed_ the operators to ask the
questions, forming the alleged basis for the suspension.110 The court upheld
the board-s decision, finding that these acts did not establish a physicianpatient relationship.111
These cases suggest that in an analogous situation, developer-physicians
NEWS ( un. 1, 2015), http://www.mhealthnews.cominews/federal-judge-sides-teladoc-texastelemedici ne-debate.
102. SeeJ ones, 2005 ND, 22 at 66 21-22, 691 N.W.2d at 259 (finding that Jones acted
unethically and provided inappropriate, harmful prescriptions over the Internet without
examining patients in person first); see also Golob, 176 P.3d at 705(finding that the board
could discipline a physician that failed to establish a physician-patient relationship with his
patients).
103. J ones, 2005 ND 22 at 6 3, 691 N.W.2d at 253-54.
104. Id. at 63, 691 N.W.2d at 253-54.
105. Id. at 66 58 & 16, 691 N.W.2d at 254-255, 257.
106. Id. at 66 20-22, 691 N.W.2d at 258.
107. Golob v. Ariz. Med. Bd., 176 P.3d 703, 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
108. Id. at 706.
109. Id. at 708.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 709.
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could face professional disciplinary action' which is akin to malpractice
liability in that it is based on deviation from the customary-practice standard
of care, but distinct, in that it does not rely upon establishment of a duty of
care owed by the physician to the patient' for providing medical services in
the absence of a physician-patient relationship.112 Notably, unlike
malpractice liability, disciplinary action would be possible even if no
identifiable patient has been harmed by the defendant-physician s actions.113
Disciplinary action of this sort is rare, but may be more likely in situations in
which a professional board perceives the physician to be engaged in a
commercial enterprise, such as app development solely for financial gain,
undermining the reputation of medicine as a calling.114
B. Professionals Relying on Apps for Patient Care
Healthcare professionals who use mobile health technologies directly in
the context of patient care may be held liable for malpractice if a patient is
harmed.s Conversely, a health professional who declines to make use of
data provided by a patientvia mobile health technology, which is likely to be
overwhelming in its volume, could be held liable if she nisses important
information, delaying diagnosis and harming the patient.' 16 But in either case,
the plaintiff must establish the breach element by showing that the defendant
failed to exercise sound professional judgment in the use, or non-use, of
mobile health technologies.' 17
The customary-practi ce standard of care adopted by courts" to adj udicate
the breach element of malpractice claims requires that when diagnosing a
condition, a physician exercises:

112. Id. (finding that the board could sanction a physician even though the physician failed
to establish a physician-patient relationship).
113. N.D. CENT. CODE f 41-17-31 (West 2015) (listing grounds for disciplinary action,
including conduct that does not necessarily harm an identifiable individual).
114. See Golob, 176 P.3d at 705 (supporting the board-s decision to sanction a physician
for profiting by doing business over the Internet without establishing relationships with
patients).
115. Medical Malpractice and Liability, Teleheath Res. Ctrs., http://www.
telehealthresourcecenter.org/toolbox-rmodule/m-edical-malpractice-and-Iiability (last visited
Mar. 18, 2016) (explaining that medical malpractice cases arise when a patient is harmed or
injured and telehealth presents unique issues in malpractice).
116. See Hofferv. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 69, 660 N.W.2d 909, 914 (finding that there is
no remedy for malpractice without an injury).
117. See McCourt ex rel. McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 607-08 (S.C. 1995)
(holding that a physician breaches the standard of care duty by failing to exercise the same
degree of care and skill as a competent physician in the same field of medicine).
118. See Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History and
Definitions: the Bad and Good News, 12W.J. EMERGENCY MED. 109,111 (2011) (statingthat
McCourt is one of the three major cases defining the modern standard of care).
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[T]he degree of skill and care... that which would be exercised by
competent practitioners in the defendant physicians field of medicine ..
Negligence may not be inferred from a bad result. Our law says that a
physician is not an insurer of health, and a physician is not required to
guarantee results. He undertakes only to meet the standard of skill
possessed generally by others practicing in his field under similar
circumstances.119

If a physician-s use or non-use of a mobile health product reflects
reasonable medical judgment then she or he is unlikely to be held liable, even
if the product malfunctions or is poorly designed, or if key information buried
in masses of irrelevant data (collected by the app more or less continuously
as opposed to during discrete clinical encounters) is missed. 12 0 In a case of
misuse, a court might consider whether the physician should have known
how to use the technology properly or should have refrained from using it if
she was not sufficiently informed regarding its proper use. 12 1 In the case of
product malfunction, the question would be whether the physician knew or
had reason to know that the product was defective, poorly designed, or
otherwise prone to malfunction. 122 In the case of non-use of patient data
provided via mobile health products, the question would be whether a
reasonably competent physician could have and would have taken hours to
sort the wheat from the chaff.123
It is worth noti ng that in about half of jurisdi cti ons, the standard of care is
defined differently for informed consent claims.124 If the basis of a claim by
an injured patient is that the physician failed to inform him adequately of the
risks associated with the use of a mobile health product or failed to inform
him of the availability of a mobile health product as an alternative to the
recommended treatment these jurisdictions adopt a patient-centered, rather
than a physician-centered, standard of care. 125 In these courts:
[T] he patient-s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to
reveal 6 .Thus the test for determining whether a particular peril must be
divulged is its materiality to the patient-s decision: all risks potentially
affecting the decision must be unmasked. And to safeguard the patient-s

119. McCourt ex rel. McCourt, 457 S.E.2d at 607 (approving trial court instructions).
120. See id. (explaining that, 'negligence may not be inferred froma bad result_).
121. See id. (stating that a physician-s duty is determined by the skill and care that a
competent physician in the same field of medicine would do under the circumstances).
122. Seeid.
123. Seeid.
124. SeeJamie S. King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case
for Shared Medical Decision-rmking, 32 AM.J.L. & MED. 429,430(2006).
125. See id. at 438-39 (explaining the importance of a patient-s knowledge of risks,
benefits, and alternatives of a procedure).
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interest in achieving his own determination on treatment, the law must
itself set the standard for adequate disclosure.126
Instead of asking whether the defendant-s actions conformed to the
customary practice of a competent physician under the circumstances, these
courts ask whether information about mobile health products that the
defendant-physician failed to provide would have been material to a
reasonable patient-s decision about whether to consent to treatment. 12 7
In some jurisdictions, this materiality issue can also play out at the 'duty
lIevel (that is, courts will determine the issue as a matter of law on a factpattern basis). For example, in Arato v. Avedon, the Supreme Court of
California ruled that as a matter of law, a physician did not have a duty to
disclose statistical life expectancy data or information material to a patient-s
non-medical interests. 128 Thus, a physician might successfully argue that she
was under no duty to discuss the risks disclosed by a patient-acquired datacollecting app.
Under either the patient-centered or physician-centered standard of care,
the malpractice doctrine obligates physicians to take reasonable steps to
inform themselves regarding the limitations of the resources available to
them and adj ust their conduct accordingly. 129 For example, in Hall v. Hilbun,
the defendant-physician argued that the hospital-provided nursing staff
members were incompetent. 130 The court found that the defendant was
obligated to adjust his conduct in light of what he knew or should have known
about the competence of the nursing staff' declining to rely on their
independent judgmrent if he knew them to be incompetent.13 1 Another case
from the same court, Boyd v. Lynch, illustrates the importance of the
reasonableness standard as applied to a physician-s reliance on available
resources. 132 Although an expert witness suggested that a physician should
generally work with a nurse for at least six months before justifiably relying
on that nurseto independently assess patients, the Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant133 The court found that, under
the circumstances, the physician-s reliance on the independent assessment of
a nurse he had known for only one month was insufficient to show that the

126. See, e.g. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
127. See id.
128. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 607 (Cal. 1993).
129. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1985), superseded by statute, Miss. Code
Ann. f 85-5-7 (2004), as recognized in Narkeeta Timber Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, 777 So.2d 39
(M iss. 2000).
130. Id. at 878-79.
131. Id. at 870, 878-79.
132. Boyd v. Lynch, 493 So.2d 1315, 1317-18 (M iss. 1986).
133. Id. at 1317, 1320.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2016

17

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 4

2016

Liability for Mobile Health& Wearable Technologies

79

defendant had breached the standard of care for general practitioner
physicians.134 Similarly, in Forsberg v. Edward Hospital and Health
Services, another state court found that the defendant physician reasonably
relied on nurses who were responsi bl e for col lecti ng surgical sponges during
a surgery. 13 s In Pacheco v. Arres, however, the court found that, under the
circumstances, the defendant oral surgeon unreasonably relied on a referring
dentist-s handwritten notation on an x-ray, resulting in a procedure performed
on the wrong side of the patient-s mouth.13 6 The relevant inquiry, then, is
whether the defendant professional s reliance on any given resource (be it a
nurse, a medical record, or a mobile health product) was reasonable under the
circumstances.137

By implication, if, for example, a physician using a connector product
misreads a patient scan on a mobile device due to poor lighting conditions,
the appropriate question for purposes of the physician-s malpractice liability
is whether she conformed to the prevailing standard of care and exercised
reasonable medical judgment under the circumstances.13 This is not much
different from a situation where a physician misreads a scan at a time when
she is experiencing blurry vision' should she have realized that conditions
were inadequate and adjusted her conduct appropriately? Was it reasonable
for her to rely on her vision, which she knew to be compromised?
Similarly, a physician-s reliance on an informer or educator app in the
course of researching a patients condition is not fundamentally different
from reliance on a print publication. Would a reasonably prudent physician
have known that the product was unreliable? If a physician relies on a
replicator product to serve as a stethoscope, or an automator product to
determine the appropriate dose of anesthesia and that product is poorly
designed or malfunctions, the question will be whether the physician-s
reliance on the product reflects sound professional judgment in light of what
she knew or should have known about it. Did the physician take reasonable
steps to inform herself of the limitations of the product?
The standard of care is typically quite forgiving, holding physicians liable
in situations where the dangers of the defendant-s approach were widely
known among peer physicians or should have been evident to her under the
circumstances, 139 but generally not requiring that physicians take
extraordinary steps to exhaustively research every technology or resource on
134. Id. at 1318.
135. Forsberg v. Edward Hosp. & Health Servs., 906 N.E.2d 729, 737(Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
136. Pacheco v. A mes, 69 P.3d 324, 330 (Wash. 2003).
137. Id.
138. E.g., Bal supra note 58, at 342.
139. See, e.g., Estate of Kurstin v. Lordan, 25 A.3d 54 (D.C. 2011) (holding physician
liable for ordering admiinistration of Lovenox during surgery, contrary to hospital policy and
widely recognized safety concerns).
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which they rely.
The adoption of a new technology may introduce some uncertainty as to
what physicians know or should know about the design and appropriate use
of that technology. Like any other treatment innovation, the customarypractice standard of care for malpractice' which boils down to what other
physicians in good standing would have done under the circumstances1 4 0
can lead to liability concerns acting as a drag on adoption of innovative
approaches. Doing things 'the old way_ can appear safer from a liability
standpoint, but that is true only up to an ill-defined tipping point at which the
innovation becomes the prevailing standard of care. In any case, the basic
inquiry is the same; there is no need for the development of new mobile
health-specific doctrines.
C. Healthcare Professionals Recomrnending Apps

-

Healthcare professionals who recommend the use of mobile health
technologies to their patients, without using them directly, could similarly be
held liable if the recommendation to use mobile health products for the
purposes of patient self-care does not reflect sound professional judgment or
deviates from the prevailing standard of care. 14 1 Again, this is not
fundamentally different from low-tech scenarios. If a nurse practitioner
recommends that a patient use a logger and tracker physical fitness app, she
must take reasonable steps to inform herself regarding the regimen that the
app will urge the patient to adopt and must apply sound medi cal judgment to
determine whether that regimen is appropriate in light of the patient-s
condition. There are probably more permutations, and perhaps more
unknowables, in this scenario compared to a nurse practitioner
recomrnendi ng that a patient starta particular exercise regimen such as P90X,
because the app is personalized and may allow for nearly endless
permutations. This problem is amplified if we are talking about a pediatrician
recomrnendi ng that parents use a customizer product that amounts to an all
in-one diagnostic tool before calling the physician. It would be harder for a
physician to evaluate all of the possible recommendations of a customizer
app than to read a book that gives basic advice on whether to call a
pediatrician or take a child to the emergency room based on particular
symptoms. But again, the basic doctrinal approach' according to which the
relevant questions are what the professional should have known about the
product she was recommending or prescribing and what, if any, warnings or
instructions regarding self-care should the professional have conveyed to the

140.
141.

See McCourt ex rel. McCourt, 457 S.E.2d at 607.
Id.
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patient' remains the same.142
IV. HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY

Institutional healthcare providers, such as hospitals and managed care
organizations, face liability exposure for either the negligence of their
employees or their own corporate or direct wrongs.143 A plaintiff pursuing
such a claim must prove not only a breach by the individual, but also that
there was a principal-agent or employer-employee relationship between the
individual and the institutional provider." Inserting this additional
requirement that plaintiff must prove an employment or agency relationship
causes an additional layer of indeterminacy in cases involving adverse events
caused by a non-employee, such as a credentialed physician. In such cases,
the plaintiff would have to prove the existence of apparent agency based on
a showing of hospital conduct plus patient reliance. 145 Only then can the
plaintiff move on to the heart of the allegation, that the hospital employee or
agent negligently approved, recommended, or prescribed an app or
wearable. 14 6
The potential for direct, or corporate, liability of healthcare institutions
dates from the famous 147 case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital. Darling articulated two major changes to how the liability system

142. Id. at 607-08.
143. See e.g., Barkes v. River Park Hosp., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 829, 833 (Tenn. 2010)
('Tennessee law clearly recognizes that hospitals owe a duty of reasonable care to their
patients and may be directly liable to patients independent of any liability based on the
hospital-s employees or agents._); see generally Gregory T. Perkes, Medical Malpractice'
Ostensible Agency and Corporate Negligence' Hospital Liability my be Based on Either
Doctrine of Ostensible Agency or Doctrine of Corporate Negligence, 17 ST. MARY s LJ. 551
(1986).
144. See Ramonev. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (explaining that if
nurses were found to be employees, employer would be held jointly liable for their
negligence).
145. See e.g., Kashishian v. Al-Bitar, 535 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding
that the trial court was wrong in holding that the physician in question was not the hospital's
agent, finding that when a patient enters a hospital, they rely on the reputation of the hospital
itself); see generally Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85 (W. Va. 2004)
(finding that the Plaintiff-s established a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of their
reliance on the apparent agency relationship between the hospital and their treating
physicians); see generally Sanchez v. Medicorp Health Sys., 270 Va. 299(2005) (holding that
the theory of agency by estoppel was not sufficient to hold the defendant hospital system
vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of its independent contractor).
146. See Burless, 601 S.E.2d at 95-96.
147. Seegenerally Mitchell J. Wiet, Darlingv. Charleston Cormmunity Mermrial Hospital
And Its Legacy, 14 ANNALs HEALTH L. 399 (2005) (discussing the impact that Darling, a
landmark Illinois Supreme Court case, has had on hospital liability cases over the past four
decades).
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approached institutional liability." First, Darling held that an institutional
provider could be directly responsible for aspects of patient care.149 This ran
counter to the then prevalent 'hotel _ doctrine, which viewed hospitals as a
merevenues in which patients and physicians interacted. 1s0 Second, Darling
undermined the customary practi ce standard of care in medical mal practi ce
cases, because it permitted accreditation standards or hospital bylaws as
alternative standards of care.1s'
States continue to refine the corporate liability doctrine-s reach. 15 2 For
example, today mostjurisdictions recognize Darling-s standard as it applies
to maintaining safe and adequate facilities and equipment, selection and
retention of only competent physicians, general oversight of those who
practice medicine within its walls, and promulgation and enforcement of
quality/safety rules and policies.' H owever, some jurisdictions stop short of
going beyond such meta-care duties." In contrast, a smaller set of
jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, have gone further as expressed by one
state high court as follows:
Today, we take a step beyond the hospital s duty of care delineated in
[earlier case law] in full recognition of the corporate hospital s role in the
total health care of its patients. In so doing, we adopt as a theory of hospital
liability the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate liability under
which the hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care
owed its patient.'
This formulation places broad responsibility on healthcare institutions for
all aspects of a patient-s care and treatment. Subject to the above
jurisdictional variations, institutional liability exposure with regard to apps
could ariseto both provider-facing and patient-facing apps.
A. Healthcare Provider-Facing Apps
Hospital-provided, provider-facing apps space is relatively undeveloped.
Providers have concentrated on providing mobile and tablet access to their
existing suite of health information technology (HIT) products, such as
electronic medical records (EMR), Clinical Decision Support software
148.

Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Meml Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253(Ill. 1965).

149.
150.
151.

Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 332.

152. See, e.g., Gafner v. Down E. Cmty. Hosp., 1999 ME 130, 735 A.2d 969 (Me. 1999).
153. See, e.g., Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 326; see also Thorrpson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d
703, 707 (Pa. 1991).
154. See, e.g., Gafner, 735 A.2d at 969 (providing that Maine would be such a jurisdiction
which stops short of going beyond meta-care duties).
155. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 708.
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(CDS) and imaging products (PA CS). Many of these 'front-end_ apps will
have been developed 'in-house_ or by developers of the underlying products.
However, EM R vendors are opening app stores' 6 and major 'software as
service suppliers such as IBM are developing health care-specific apps.157
As a result, providers may soon owe duties to patients regarding the careful
selection, deployment, staffing, and updating of these new technologies."'
Individual employees or credentialed physicians also introduce apps and
their hardware platforms into healthcare institutions. One example of this
bring-your-own-device (BY OD) phenomenon is the use of Google Glass
('G lass_) in surgery and other tasks within an institution. In the case of Glass,
serious ethical and legal risks are raised because of the potential of the device
to capture video and i mages, and the doubts about its ability to satisfy HIPAA
security requirements."' Hospitals that have not updated their BY OD
policies or otherwise controlled the use of unauthorized apps or wearables
could face liability in the event of an adverse event. A related concern arises
with regard to apps with social media characteristics that, for example,
encourage health care professionals to post images of patients." We suggest
that due consideration for good risk management practices should necessitate
that hospitals update their social media policies to prohibit app uses that may
involve legal or ethical risks.16 1
B. Patient-Facing Apps
In general, consumers drive the processes of choosing and usi ng mobile
apps. However, an institutional provider, like the physician discussed above
might insert itself into such processes by recommending or prescribing apps.
Consider, for example, the pitch made by one provider for its health app
156. Judy Newrman, Epic Systeim to Open its Own App Exchange, Wis. ST. J. (Feb 18,
2015), http://host.rmdison.comwsj/business/epic-to-open-its-own-app-exchange/article_fc7
e8b94-bl ec-59f4-9065-1 e6143fe351 c.html.
157. IBM MobileFirst for iOS, IBM, http://www.ibmcomfmobilefirst/us/en/mrobilefirstfor-ios/(last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
158. See generally Am Health Info. Mgmt. Ass-n. The Imrplerrentation and Managerrent
of Patient Portals, 86 J. OF AHIMA 50-55 (April 2015), http://ibrary.ahirm.org/xpedio/
groups/public/docurrents/ahima/bokl_050877.hcsp?dDocNarre=bokl_050877;
see also
Sandeep S. Mangalmurti, Lindsey Murtagh, and Michelle M. Mello, Medical Malpractice
Liability in the Age of Electronic Health Records, 363 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 2060, 2060
(2010).
159. Terry et al., supra note 51.
160. See e.g., Meera Senthiligram :Instagramfor Doctors- Lets Medics Share Photos to
Solve Mystery Cases, CNN (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/
1 0/tech/figurel -photos-medical-app/.
161. See generally Nicolas Terry, Fear of Facebook: Private Ordering of Social Media
Risks Incurred by Healthcare Providers, 90 NEB. L. REV. 703-51 (2012); Social
Media Guidelines for Employees, USC UNIV. Hosp., http://www.uscuniversityhospital.org/
connect/wp-content/uploads/Social-Media- Guidelines-for-Employees.pdf.

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol25/iss2/4

22

Terry and Wiley: Liability for Mobile Health and Wearable Technologies*

Annals of Health Law

84

Vol. 25

curation through a hospital-branded app and iPad 'bar_:
Patients with diabetes, high cholesterol or smoking cessation needs can test
the best apps to manage their health and wellness ...

For those who find

the process overwhelming, the [bar] is staffed by a technology specialist
who can assist in choosing the right product or app for your lifestyle as
well as providing setup guidance and support.162
Clearly, providers that recommend or curate apps or coach patients in their
use will have increased exposure if their choices or techniques are negligent
and cause damage. Some institutional providers may seek to make curation
more manageable by maintaining limited app formularies, although that
could backfire if the contents of the formulary do not keep pace with the
rapidly changing app ecosystem. 163 That leads to a broader observation as to
the standard of care appropriate for app recommending or curati ng. T he very
few prescription-only apps currently available are typically for diabetes or
other chronic disease monitoring," and as with other prescribing duties, a
professional standard of care would seem appropriate. 16s However, a court
could view recommending or curating apps as more of a ministerial task and
use a more general standard of care with regard to keeping abreast of
technical developments. 16 6
C. Informed Consent
Liability assertions involving recommendation or curation are essentially
informational, which raises the issue of whether and to what extent informed
consent duties are implicated by health care app use. Consider, for example,
a provider approving or endorsing the use of an i nnovative, augmented or
virtual reality wearable during surgery or a provider recommending a novel
162.

Ochsner-s 0 Bar Makes it Easier for Patients to Manage their Health, OCHSNER
(Nov. 17, 2014), http://blog.ochsner.org/articles/ochsners-o-bar-makes-iteasier-for-patients-to-manage-their-health.
163. See FED. TRADE COMM N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docum-ents/reports/federaltrade-commi ssi on-bureau-consumer- protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protectingconsumer/1 01201 privacyreport. pdf.
164. See, e.g., Roberto A. Ferdman, The World-s First Prescription-Only Srartphone
App, QUARTZ ( an. 6, 2014), http://qz.com/163792/the-worlds-first-prescription-onlysmartphone-app/.
165. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1985) (discussing the higher standard of
care for physicians).
166. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) ('Under the facts of this
case reasonable prudence required the timely giving of the pressure test to this plaintiff. The
precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glaucoma to patients under 40 years of
age is so imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the standards of the opthalmology
profession, it is the duty of the courts to say what is required to protect patients under 40 from
the damaging results of glaucoma._).
HEALTH

SYSTEM
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disease monitoring app. Would such a patient be entitled to additional risk
disclosures? Some courts have held that when a device is used in an
experimental or novel way, informed consent from patients must be
obtained.167 Should a provider offer additional disclosures if a prescription
app was prescribed for an off-label use?1" Some courts have allowed that
question to reach a jury. 169
An informed consent theory especially would be of particular value to
plaintiffs in the slight ninority of jurisdictions that apply a patient
expectations approach to informed consent rather than the professional
standard used elsewhere."o However, the informed consent avenue of
liability may be moot. The conventional wisdom suggests that the riskdisclosure duty is exclusively owed by physicians and not by institutional
providers."' Although one recent case held that a 'hospital has an
independent duty to obtain informed consent_ when it allowed 'the use of
equipment that is not part of the hospital s usual inventory, _1 7 2 any more
generalized informed consent duty owed by hospitals seems to remain
probl emati c.
V. PRODUCT LIABILITY, WARRANTY,

UCC, & RELATED

CLAIMS

Many provider-facing apps are essentially extensions of traditional HIT
devices, such as EMRs and CDS products that already have risk profiles.173
By 2010, the FDA was collecting reports of HIT-related safety concerns,
classifying them as follows:
(1) errors of commission, such as accessing the wrong patient's record or

167. See, e.g., Estrada v. J aques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
168. See Osburnv. Danek Med., Inc., 520 S.E.2d 88, 95(N.C. Ct. App. 1999); seeYadin
David & William Hayman, Issues Associated with Off Label Useof Medical Devices, INST. OF
ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICs ENGINEERs 3556, 3356-57 (Aug. 2007).
169. See, e.g., DeNeui v. Wellman, 2008 WL 4065816, at *7 (D.S.D. 2008); see also40
PA. STAT. f 1303.504(a)(5) (2002) (requiring informed consent for 'using an experimental
device or using an approved medication or device in an experimental manner_).
170. See Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ind. 1992) (applying majority
'professional standard_ rule and discussing authorities in detail); cf. Largey v. Rothman, 540
A.2d 504, 506 (NJ. 1988) (applying patient standard).
171. See, e.g., Pauscherv. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987); Ward
v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Socy of Am, 963 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Alaska 1998) (stating,
'Alaska is the only state that imposes on hospitals a non-delegable duty to provide quality
emergency medical care. Unless the patient selects the physician herself, a general acute care
hospital will be liable for the physician-s negligence in the energency room_).
172. Nguyen v. IHC Med. Servs., 288 P.3d 1084, 1092 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
173. Although the app/wearable space is new, many of the liability issues are similar to
those raised by the deployment of more conventional health information technologies. See,
e.g., Nicolas Terry, When the Machine That Goes :Ping- Causes Harm Default Torts Rules
and Technologically-Mediated Health CareInjuries, 46 ST. LouIs U. LJ. 37, 47-59 (2002).
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overwriting one patient's information with another's; (2) errors of
omission or transmission, such as the loss or corruption of vital patient
data; (3) errors in data analysis, including medication dosing errors of
several orders of magnitude; and (4) incompatibility between multi-vendor
software applications and systems, which can lead to any of the above.174
Additionally, there has been considerable critical research regarding 'alert
fatigue_ and other problems with the interfaces used by HIT products.s
There is little doubt that product liability models would apply to HIT devices
and their mobile extensions.176 Indeed, the HIT industry has been heavily
criticized for attempting to shift such risks to providers.17 7 There is slightly
less certainty that product liability-type theories apply to stand-alone apps
(i.e., software without hardware) or to consumer-facing apps. However, the
few courts that have faced the issue seem to agree that there is potential
liability for '[c]omputer software that fails to yield the result for which it was
designed_"7 by analogy to liability found in cases involving defective
aeronautical charts.179
A. Product Liability
State law product liability actions may be brought for personal or property
injury caused by product defects associated with manufacture, design or
inadequate warning. However, substantial limitations apply with regard to
FDA-regulated medical devices because of application of the preemption
174. Testimony of Jeffrey Shuren, Health Information Technology (HIT)
Policy Committee Adoption/Certification Workgroup (Feb.
25, 2010), http://
www.cchfreedom.org/pr/Health%20IT0%2ODeaths%20%20FDA0%20jeffrey%20Shuren.pdf;

see generally U.S.

FOOD

& DRUG

ADMIN.,

FDASIA

HEALTH

IT

REPORT

(2014), http://www.

fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedical ProductsandTobacco/C DR/
CD RH Reports/U CM 391521.pdf.
175. See generally Nicolas Terry, Foreword: Drug-Drug Interaction Warnings as
Technological latrogenesis, 5 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL-Y, 251, 251-55 (2012); see
also Nicolas Terry, Pit Crews With Computers: Can Health Information Technology Fix
Fragmented Care? 14 Hous.i. HEALTH L. & POLY, 129(2014).
176. See generally Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider
Liability and Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1579(2009).
177. Ross Koppel & David Kreda, Health Carelnformation Technology Vendors- 'Hold
Harmless Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians, 301 JAMA 1276, 1276 (2009).
178. Winter v. G.P. Putnam-s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. Wilson v.
Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 172 (D. Conn. 2002) (ruling against plaintiff in
video game case but not necessarily disagreeing with liability in Winters-type cases involving
'harm resulting from reliance on instruction manuals, cookbooks, navigational charts and
similar materials_).
179. See generally T. Randolph Beard et al., Tort Liability for Software Developers: A
Law & Econoics Perspective, 27J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 199, 208-09(2009).
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY f2, f6 (AM. LAW INST.
1998); cf. U.C.C. f2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM N 1977) (explaining that
parallel claims may also be brought for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability).
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doctrine. 81 In contrast, a private right of action may exist at federal law for
harms caused by products regulated by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission rather than the FDA. 182
Looking to the future, plaintiffs- attorneys no doubt will consider a
plethora of product liability allegations against app developers, wearable
manufacturers, and their distributors. It is anticipated that arguments will be
made that fitness and wellness apps recommended either over-exercise or
under-exercise, and it is unlikely to be long before some plaintiff alleges a
new syndrome such as 'exercise addiction. 183 Other quantified-self apps
have faced such exposure. For example, in 2012, the family of an 'obsessed_
cyclist, who died trying to break a record, unsuccessfully sued the developer
of a bicycle GPS app that awarded 'King of the Mountain_ status to top
performers, 11 with the trial court concluding that the cyclist 'assumed the
risks of bicycling and that the defendant (Strava) has shown that bicycling is
an inherent risky activity.j
Annually there are large numbers of deaths and injuries caused by exercise
equipment.' 6 Increasingly, health apps will either control that equipment or
potentially cause distractions for users."
As the wearable market matures, devices will increasingly be built into

181. See Rodriguez v. Am Med. Sys., 597 F. Appx. 226, 228 (5th Cir. 2014).
182. 15 U.S.C. f 2072 (1981); see also Zepik v. Tidewater Midwest Inc., 856 F.2d 936,
943 (7th Cir. 1988).
183. See K ristina Berczik et al., Exercise Addiction: Syrptoms, Diagnosis, E piderriology,
and Etiology, 47 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 403(2011).
184. Liz Gannes, GPS App Strava Sued Over Cyclists Death, ALL THINGS D (Jun. 19,
2012), http://allthingsd.com/20120619/gps-app-strava-sued-over-cyclists-death/; Helen Pidd,
Strava - The App That Turns Cyclists Into Racers, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 31, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.comlifeandstyle/shortcuts/2013/jul/31/strava-app-cyclists-racerssmartphone.
185. Flinty. Strava, 2013WL 9744334, *1 (Cal. Super. Ct.June24, 2013) (ordergranting
motion for summary judgment); see also One-Year-Old Lawsuit Against Strava Dismissed,
BICYCLE RETAILER (J une4, 2013), http://www.bicycleretailer.comnorth-america/2013/06/04/
one-year-old-lawsuit-against-strava-dismissed#V tWs2sfp38t.
186. See Research& Statistics: Injury Statistics, U.S. CONSUMER PROD.SAFETY COMM N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Research' Statistics/Injury-Statistics/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2016)
(providing, for example, that between 2012 and 2014 there were approximately 72,900 injuries
seen in hospital emergency rooms).
187. See, e.g., Michael E. Miller, Dave Goldberg-s Death Points to Rise and Risks of
Treadmills in Era of Srmartphones, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost
com/news/morni ng-mix/wp/201 5/05/05/dave-gol dbergs-death-poi nts-to-rise-and-risks-oftreadrrills-in-era-of-siart-phones/tid=hpmm& hpid=z3 ('[Dave] Goldberg slipped and fell
while using one of the [treadrrl Ils] [ ...] He hit his head and died from brain trauma and blood
loss._); Aamer Madhani, Treadmill Injuries Send Thousands to the ER Every Year, USA
TODAY (May 5, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://www.usatoday.comstory/news/2015/05/04/treadmillemergency-room-injuries-exercise-equi pment/26898487/ (describing injuries caused by
exercise equi pment).
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clothing 88 or have sensors or other mechanisms that more directly contact
the skin, arguably increasing risk. For example, in 2014, Fitbit recalled its
Fitbit Force wearable after more than 10,000 purchasers complained of skin
blisters and rashes. 9 The company only avoided a recall of its Flex product
by agreeing to warn of allergens such as nickel. 190
In an emerging field, courts likely will look to a broad array of expert
evidence and other normative sources to flesh out the meaning of
defectiveness in app and wearable cases. For example, the FDA, while
exercising its discretion and not applying device regulation to most apps,
nevertheless,
[S]trongly recommends that manufacturers of all mobile apps that may
meet the definition of a device follow the Quality System regulation
(which includes good manufacturing practices) in the design and
development of their mobile medical apps and initiate prompt corrections
to their mobile medical apps, when appropriate, to prevent patient and user
harm 191

Similarly, platform owners may help courts understand safe practices. For
example, Apple s App Store Developer Guidelines already set a reasonably
high bar for app privacy and security standards. 192 T he same company also
publishes developer guidelines on designing interfaces and optimizing
usability,193 and has published detailed rules as to how the third party

188. See Zach Miners, Under Armour Snaps Up MyF itnessPal to Become Largest Health
Tracker, PCWORLD (Feb 5, 2015, 7:32AM), http://www.pcworld.comarticle/2880312/underarmour-buys-two-fitness-apps-bui lds-trove-of-health-data.html (referencing popular devices
like Fitbit and J awbone).
189. Fitbit Recalls ForceActivity-Tracking Wristband Dueto Risk of Skin Irritation, U.S.
CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM-N (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Recalls/
2014/Fitbit-Recalls-Force-Activity-Tracking-Wristband/.
190. See Rachel Abrams, After One Product Recall, Fitbit Faces a New Safety Inquiry,
N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/business/after-productrecall-fitbit-faces-a-new-safety-inquiry.html?_r-0 (explaining United States requirements to
warn consumers about the risks of nickel exposure from Fitbits and of wearing the device too
tightly).
191. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 13 (2015) (referring to 21 C.F.R. f
820 (2011)).
192. See App Store Review Guidelines, HealthKit and Humn Subject Research, APPLE,
https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/#healthkit (last visited Feb. 16,
2016) (outlining privacy guidelines in Section 17) ('Apps cannot transmit data about a user
without obtaining the user-s prior permission and providing the user with access to information
about how and where the data will be used._); see Terry, supra note 13, at 1431.
193. iOS Humn Interface Guidelines: HealthKit, APPLE, https://developer.apple.
com/Iibrary/ios/documrentation/UserExperience/Conceptual/MobileHIG/HealthKit.html (last
visited March 18, 2016) (explaining that 'apps built with HealthKit can use data from the
Health app to provide health and fitness services that are more powerful and integrated_).
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watchbands should ensure that its Watch sensors are in contact with a user-s
ski n.194
Overall, the extent of a product manufacturers liability for privacy, but
more ominously, security breaches, is an open question. How should
manufacturers react to potential cyberattacks?195 At least in the near term
manufacturer compliance or non-compliance with store or sub-regulatory
gui dance'9 6 may influence the applicable norms.
B. Efficacy, Effectiveness, and Warranty Claims
In general terms, strict product liability does not apply to pure economic
harms or complaints about product performance.197 Rather, plaintiffs in such
cases must bring contractual or express warranty claims." In some states,
consumer protection statutes grant private rights of action for such product
'disappointments._ 19

A good example of an effectiveness issue, albeit one pursued by the FTC
and not a private action for damages, was raised against two developers who
made 'mole apps. _200 Defendants apps (going by names such as MelApp
and Mole Detective) lIeveraged a smartphone platform-s camera to capture a
picture of a mole and then requested the user to i nput other information.201

194. Band Design Guidelines for Apple Watch, APPLE 5-6 (May 6, 2015),
https://developer.apple.com/watch/bands/Band-Design-Guidelines-for-Apple-Watch.pdf
('Bands must not prevent the user-s skin from maintaining direct contact with the Apple
Watch heart rate sensors and back of Apple Watch, and must incorporate sufficient rmrgin to
compensate for shifting or dimensional changes of the band material. Failure to do so may
interfere with Apple Watch wrist detect and Apple Pay features.).
195. See generally John Villasenor, If a Cyberattack Causes a Car Crash, Who Is
Liable?, SLATE MAG. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.slate.con/blogs/future-tense/201 5/
08/11/ifAa cyberattack-causes_a_car crash who isliable.html?wpsrc=fol-tw (questioning
who is liable in cyberattacks).
196. See e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2016) (providing FDA guidance on how to handle cyberattacks);
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2014) (providing additional FDA guidance on medical premarket

submissions for effective cybersecurity management).
197. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica, 476 U.S. 858, 872-73(1986).
198. For example, a plaintiff can bring a claim under UCC f2-313. Id. at 872 ('The
maintenance of product value and quality is precisely the purpose of express and implied
warranties. _).
199. See e.g., Wis. STAT. f 402.314 (2015) (implied warranty, merchantability, usage of
trade).
200. Health Discovery Corp. & FTC v. Avrom Boris Lasarow, 2015-1 Trade Cases P
17280, 2015 WL 926509 61 (Feb. 23, 2015) (referring to mobile apps that provide automated
analyses of moles and skin lesions for symptoms of melanoma).
201. Id.
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The apps then purported to calculate the risk of the skin imperfection being
pre-cancerous or cancerous.2 02 Crucially, the FTC applied a 'competent and
reliable scientific evidence_ standard for the substantiation of claims:
[H]uman clinical testing of the Device that is sufficient in quality and
quantity, based on standards generally accepted by experts in the relevant
field, when considered in light of the entire body of relevant and reliable
scientific evidence, to substantiate that the representation is true. Such
testing shall be blinded, conform to actual use conditions, and include a
representative range of skin lesions; be conducted by researchers qualified
by training and experience to conduct such testing; and all underlying or
supporting data and documents generally accepted by experts in the
relevant field as relevant to an assessment of such testing ... must be
available for inspection and production to the Commission.203

In a dissenting statement Commissioner Ohlhausen complained that her
colleagues had imposed an 'inappropriately high substantiation requirement
on a relatively safe product. 204 However, the majority-s approach to the
substantiation standard was upheld by the DC Circuit in POM Wonderful,
LLC v. FTC. 205 Subsequently, the FTC has applied the same substantiation
standard in the Carrot Neurotechnology case ordering an app developer to
cease making scientifically unsubstantiated claims that its app could improve
users-vision or vision rest results. 20 6
Increasingly, apps and wearabl es are being tested for effectiveness against
established baselines. 207 For example, a recent study tested thirty popular
mobile apps for programming physical activity.208 Their performance was
weighed against guidelines and fitness principles established by the
Armerican College of Sports Medicine (ACSM). 20 9 T he study concluded that

202.

Id.

203. Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comnritment at Part I, Health
Discovery Corp. & FTC v. Avrom Boris Lasarow, et al., Trade Reg. Rep. 617280 (Feb. 23,
2015).
204.

Id.

205. See generally Porn Wonderful, LLC v. F.T.C., 777 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(alleging false claims that POM products could treat, prevent or reduce the risk of heart
disease, prostate cancer, and erectile dysfunction, although seventeen of thirty-six ads had
qualifying language).
206. See Complaint, Carrot Neurotechnology, Inc., F.T.C. No. 142-3132 (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docum-ents/cases/160223carrotneurodo.pdf.
207. See, e.g., Fran'ois Modave et al., Low Quality of Free Coaching Apps With Respect
to the American College of Sports Medicine Guidelines: A Review of Current Mobile Apps, 3
J. MED. INTERNET RES. 125, 125 (2015) ('[N]o systematic assessment has been performed
about [the quality of apps and wearables as they relate to sound fitness principles] . . [t]he
aim of this paper is to fill this gap and asses the quality of mobile coaching apps . . . _.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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'very few_ of the apps 'are evidence based, and respect the gui deli nes for
aerobic activity, strength/resistance training, and flexibility, set forth by the
ACSM. 210 Indeed, only one app even scored over fifty percent in the
comparison.2 11
A California class action may be the liability 'canary in the coalmine._
The complaint argues Fitbit devices overestimated sleep by sixty-seven
minutes per night compared to polysomnography and forty-three minutes
compared to the less-accurate actigraphy.2 12 The claim, which alleges the
breach of various state statutes, fraud, and breach of warranty,2 13 is largely
predicated on the findings published in a peer-reviewed sleep journal.2 14
C. App Certifiers and Healthcare Providers
Product liability and warranty claims primarily apply to 'commercial
sellers. _215 However, in this evolving space, it may be that regulators and
litigators seek to extend responsibility to emerging entrants such as app stores
(that either do or do not curate or police their offerings), or computing clouds
that offer not only data storage but, increasingly, cloud-based analytic
services.
There have been a few cases that have extended liability, typically using a
negligence standard, to others not directly in the stream of commerce.216
Specifically, some older cases have imposed liability on actors who
recommended or certified products. 2 17 This has particular salience given a

proposal that organizations should undertake the review or certifications of
mobile health apps. 218 The proposal further recommend that such
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Class Action Complaint & Demand forj ury Trial at 6 6 20-21, Brickman v. FitBit,
Inc., No. 3:15-cv-2077 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2015).
213. Id. at 6647-143.
214. See Hawley E. Montgomery-Downs et al., Movement Toward a Novel Activity
Monitoring Device, 16 SLEEP & BREATHING: INT L J. SCl. & PRAC. SLEEP MED. 913, 916
(2011).
215.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS

LIABILITY

11

(AM. LAW INST.

1998).
216. See generally Robert C. Feldmeier, The Risk of Negligence Liability for Trade
Association Engaged in Standards Setting or Product Certification, 34TORT & INS. L.J. 785
(1999).
217. See, e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rpt. 519(Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (involving
a plaintiff magazine company that recommended and certified shoes); Hempstead v. Gen. Fire
Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967) (involving a defendant fire extinguisher
manufacturers hired testing company that certified and proscribed standards with which to
operate its fire extinguisher); cf. Dekens v. Underwriters Lab. Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (involving a plaintiff consulting firm that recommended employment safety
practices).
218. Adam C. Powell et al., In Search of a Few Good Apps, 311 JAMA 1851, 1851-52
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'organizations would likely need to include in their reviews a certification
process to ensure that apps do not pose potential harm to their users or have
significant security and privacy vulnerabilities. 219 In the mobile health
space, one company, Happtique, did attempt a certification process for app
privacy and security.220 However, it quickly suspended the program after a
third party cast doubts on the security of two of the products it certified.221
Although courts have a relatively broad sense of who can be a defendant
in a product liability action, they have not extended liability to healthcare
providers. 222 T he general rule is that
The hospital is not in the business of selling or even leasing, bailing or
licensing equipment to the physician. It is in the business of providing
medical services to its patients and of providing the environment in which
physicians may provide their own medical treatment to the patients. Rather
than being a supplier or an entity that places a product in 'the stream of
commerce, _ the hospital, as well as the physician, is an ultimate consumer
of hospital equipment which is used in the treatment of the patient. 223

This rule should shield most physicians and hospitals from strict liability
when they provide a third-party app to a patient 224 The answer might be
different if the institution is the app developer or commissioner, an issue
likely to be tested as maj or medical centers produce branded apps for their
patients.225 In any case, and as discussed above, the provider may still face
liability in negligence for recommending apps, but is unlikely to under strict
products liability.226

(2014). On certification models in health care, see generally Frank A. Pasquale, Private
Certifiers and Deputies inArrerican Health Care, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1661 (2014).
219. Powell et al., supra note 218, at 1851.
220. Stephanie Baum, Happtique Suspends mHealth App Certification Program After
Software Developer Exposes Security Shortcoings, MED. CITY NEWS, Dec. 12, 2013, 4:10
PM,
http://medcitynews.com2013/12/happtique-suspends-mhealth-certification-programsoftware-developer-exposes-security-flaws/.
221. Id.
222. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY I 20(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1998) ('One sells a product when, in a commercial context one transfers ownership thereto
either for use or consumption or for resale leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial
product sellers include, but are not limited to, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.).
223. San Diego Hosp. Ass-n. v. Superior Court 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 493 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994); seegenerally Laura Pleicones, Note, Passing The EssenceTest: Health Care Providers
Escape Strict Liability For Medical Devices, 50 S.C. L. REV. 463,464(1999).
224. See generally Pleicones, supra note 223.
225. See generally id.
226. See Patricia M. Danzon, Liabilityfor Medical Malpractice, 5J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 51
(1991).
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VI. PRIVACY -SECURITY LIABILITY EXPOSURE

The Privacy and Security Rules authorized by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), present a complianceoriented regulatory model and do not provide for a private right of action.227
In 2009, the HIPAA-amending Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act included a provision that
would allow persons injured by privacy or security breaches to receive
compensation based on a 'percentage of any civil monetary penalty or
monetary settlement. 228 However, this provision has not been acted upon,
for reasons that are unclear.229 In contrast to federal law, a small number of
state privacy statutes allow for a private right of action. For example,
Cal ifornia-s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (C MIA) provides:
In addition to any other remedies available at law, a patient whose medical
information has been used or disclosed 6 and who has sustained economic
loss or personal injury therefrom may recover compensatory damages,
punitive damages not to exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000), attorneys
fees not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), and the costs of
litigation.230
Notwithstanding, most plaintiffs injured by a provider or developer data
breach will have to rely on common law causes of action.
A. Causes of Action
The traditional common law privacy torts, such as intrusion on seclusion
or public disclosure of private facts, are discrete, limited causes of action that
provide damage remedies for a limited range of unlawful data collection.231
Dependent on a showing of specific intent they are also quite difficult to
prove.23 2
Of considerably more utility is the breach of confidence tort that applies
to those who disclose information that had been given to them in privacy.233

227.
228.
229.

See45 C.F.R. f 160 (2013); 45 C.F.R. f 164(2013).
42 U.S.C. f 17939 (2010).
Id.

230.

CAL. CIV. CODE f 56.35 (West 2000).

231.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

f 652A-652B, 652H (AM.

LAW INST.

1977).

232. See, e.g., Knightv. Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr., 420 A.2d 915 (Me. 1980) (rejecting
plaintiffs appeal of lower court-s ruling that defendants, a hospital, a doctor, a nurse, and an
observer, invaded plaintiffs- privacy); cf. Estate of Berthiaurme v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me.
1976) (sustaining the administratrix- appeal of the grant of a directed verdict in favor of the
surgeon and ordered a new trial as to the adininistratrix- invasion of privacy and assault and
battery causes of action involving the photographs of her deceased husband which were taken
by the surgeon while her husband was dying).
233. See, e.g., Johns v. Firstar Bank, NA, No. 2004-CA-001558-MR, 2006 Ky. App.
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This contextual requirement of a confidential relationship could be
established against providers via the traditional physician-patient relationship
and against developers with an implied contractargument. Mostjurisdi ctions
now recognize the breach of confidence as a tort.23 It is essentially a strict
liability action235 and, at least in this regard, is similar to HIPAA and state
health privacy statutes. To prevail against a provider, the plaintiff would
have to prove 'unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical
information that a physician or hospital has learned within a physician-patient
relationship. _236

Recently, a further limitation was recognized by the New York Court of
Appeals, which held that a claim for unauthorized disclosure of medical
information could not run directly against medical corporations when the
employee responsible for the breach was not a physician and was acting
outside the scope of her employrment. 237 Beyond issues arising in breach of
confidence cases, there is a growing body of fact-intensive case law dealing
with the responsibility of healthcare data custodians for the misfeasance of
their employees.238
A common issue in privacy and security litigation is how such state-s
causes of action interact with the HIPAA privacy and security rules. As
decisively stated by the Fifth Circuit in Acara v. Banks:
HIPAA does not contain any express language conferring privacy rights
upon a specific class of individuals. Instead, it focuses on regulating
persons that have access to individually identifiable medical information
and who conduct certain electronic health care transactions. HIPAA
provides both civil and criminal penalties for improper disclosures of
medical information. However, HIPAA limits enforcement of the statute
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Because HIPAA
specifically delegates enforcement, there is a strong indication that
Unpub. LEXIS 85, at *8-9 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2006).
234. See, e.g., Biddlev. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999).
235. See generally Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 590 (D.C.
1985) (reasoning that the 'linited duty conveys a standard that is more strict than the
reasonable man test_).
236. See Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 528.
237. Doev. Guthrie Clinic, Ltd., 5 N.E.3d 578, 582 (N.Y. 2014).
238. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99, 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (ruling
on question of fact as to whether pharmacist acting within scope of employment when she
looked up prescription records belonging to girlfriend of ex-partner); cf. Robbins v. Trs. of
Ind. Univ., No. 49AO4-1412-CT-583, 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 663 (Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2015)
(holding that while the nurse-s employer, the trustees, authorized her to access patient
information for business reasons, she was expressly not authorized to access, use, or disclose
the information for personal, unauthorized, unethical, or illegal reasons, and the nurse-s
actions were not sufficiently associated with her employment duties so as to have fallen within
the scope of her employment); cf. Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 675
(Ohio Ct. A pp. 2015).
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.

Congress intended to preclude private enforcementi

While no other circuit court has specifically addressed this issue, we are
not alone in our conclusion that Congress did not intend for private
enforcement of HIPAA. Every district court that has considered this issue
is in agreement that the statute does not support a private right of
action... .239

Thus a private right of action may not be implied in HIPAA nor may the
federal regulatory scheme be used to fashion a state negligence per se action.
However, it does not follow that all jurisdictions will treat HIPAA as
irrelevant to state tort claims such as breach of confidence, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, or even simple
negligence. For example, in the recent case of Byrne v. Avery Center for
Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C., the court not only denied the defendant-s
argument that HIPAA preempted state common law causes of action but also
stated:
[T]o the extent it has become the common practice for Connecticut health
care providers to follow the procedures required under HIPAA in rendering
services to their patients, HIPAA and its implementing regulations may be
utilized to inform the standard of care applicable to such claims arising
from allegations of negligence in the disclosure of patients medical
records.240
Notwithstanding that HIPAA isa 'compelled_ custom, it has been adopted
by most health care providers suggesting that HIPAA-derived norms will be
increasingly important in privacy and security litigation.241
B. Causation and Darnages Issues
Strict liability breach of confidence actions and HIPAA-informed
negligence actions undoubtedly help plaintiffs hold defendants liable for
privacy and security breaches. However, plaintiffs still face two linked and
persistent problems: proving causation and damages. Many of these issues
surface in security breach class actions where they are magnified by Article
III standing issues242 and the certification requirements of commonality and
239. Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006).
240. Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 49 (Conn.
2014).
241. Karen J. Maschke, The Implications of the HIPAA Privacy Rule for QualityIm-provemrentActivities, in HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT: ETHICAL AND REGULATORY
ISSUES 107, 122 (BruceJ ennings, et al. ed., 2007).
242. See generally Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014)
(hearing a suit brought by advocacy organizations challenging an Ohio statute that
criminalized false statements about candidates during political campaigns); Clapper v.
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predominance. 24 3
Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., is a rare case decided in plaintiffs- favor on this
issue. 2 T hi eves stole two unencrypted Iaptops containing information on 1.2
million patients from a health insurer.24 5 The plaintiff class representatives,
two plan members who had histories of being particularly careful with their
personal or sensitive information, alleged inter alia negligence, negligence
per se, and breach of contract.24 6 Within a year of the theft both plaintiffs
had been vi cti is of identity theft.247 T he El Ieventh Circuit C ourt held that the
pleading of causation was sufficient to avoid dismissal. 24 Specifically, the
court noted that the plaintiffs had 'pled a cognizable injury and have pled
sufficient facts to allow for a plausible inference that [defendant-s] failures
in securing their data resulted in their identities being stolen.249 They have
shown a sufficient nexus between the data breach and the identity theft
beyond allegations of time and sequence. 250
In some cases, a state data protection statute that provides for nominal
damages may throw plaintiff a lifeline. However, in Sutter Healthv. Superior
Court even that was insufficient.25 1 The California statute in question, part
of the C MIA, provided for nominal damages of $1,000.00, noting that, '[i]n
order to recover under this paragraph, it shall not be necessary that the
plaintiff suffered or was threatened with actual damages. _252 Given that four
million medical records had been stolen, the stakes were high.253 T he court
ruled that the theft of the data was insufficient and that the statutory damage
provision was not triggered until, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the
confidentiality of their records had been lost by showing the thief had viewed
the stolen i nformati on.25

Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013) ('[R]espondents cannot manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future
harm that is not certainly i mpending. _; see also, Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U. S.
Dist. LEXIS 58047, at*6 (E.D. La. May4, 2015); see, e.g., Renijasv. Neiman Marcus Grp.,
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding victims of cyber theft of credit card
information plausibly alleged standing to bring class action).
243. FED.R.CIv.P.23.
244. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2012).
245. Id. at 1322.
246. Id. at 1321.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1330.
250. Id.
251. S utter Health v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
252. CAL. CIV. CODE f 56.36 (West 2016).
253. Sutter, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 655.
254. Id. at 662.
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VII. CONCLUSION

Physicians and healthcare institutions are accustomed to adapting as new
technologies and methods are introduced. In particular, emerging
technologies often introduce uncertainty as to the applicable knowledge base
and their appropriate deployment or use. Mobile health and wearables may
prove particularly challenging because of their hybrid existence, sometimes
inside and sometimes outside, the traditional provider-patient relationship
and its relatively tightly regulated domain.
In this context the private liability model, or regulation by litigation, is
particularly troublesome. A case-by-case liability decision-making model
will tend to exhibit particular indeterminacy when faced with novel issues.
As with any other treatment innovation, the customary-practice standard of
care for malpractice can chill or accelerate adoption of new approaches.
Doing things 'the old way_ can appear safer froma liability standpoint. But
that is true only up to an ill-defined tipping point at which the innovation
becomes the prevailing standard of care. Malpractice liability for healthcare
providers who participate in the design of, rely on, or recommend and
prescribe mobile health products does not raise novel legal issues. However,
existing legal doctrines will likely influence the development and adoption
of mobile health products by healthcare professionals.
The FDA has decided on a very 'light_ approach to the regulation of
mobile health apps and wearables, in all probability based on a deternination
that any perception of over-regulation would stifle innovation. An alternative
argument is that regulatory certainty would reduce market anxiety and spur
development.255 When it comes to the more dignitary losses that occur when
privacy or security are breached, traditional regulatory systems such as
HIPAA do not provide remedies for individuals. Here too, relatively
underdeveloped common law analogs will be applied, bringing with them
another set of i ndetermi naci es.
What is clear is that regulation by litigation currently does apply to the
mobile health space. However, the applicable common law doctrines are by
nature fact-intensive and, at least in the early days of application to novel fact
patterns, tend to exhibit high levels of indeterminacy.

255.

Cortez, supra note 13, at 1179.
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